近日，肖作平教授团队以第一作者或者通讯作者身份又有两篇学术论文“Directors' prior life experience and corporate donations: Evidence from China”，“Internal pyramid structure, contract enforcement, minority investor protection, and firms' performance: Evidence from emerging economies”分别发表于国际SSCI期刊NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE（JCR 2区）和RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND FINANCE（JCR 2区）。
（1）Directors' prior life experience and corporate donations: Evidence from China
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2020.101191
Abstract:We use a recent dataset of 16,082 firm-year observations from publicly traded Chinese firms to show that directors who have prior foreign study or work experience make more corporate donations, a result that supports the path dependency theory related to the effect of prior experiences on subsequent behaviors. The relationship between a director's prior life experiences and corporate charitable contributions is robust across different types of ownership and industry. We show that corporate donations enable firms to have better access to bank loans, reducing their financial constraints. In addition, these directors appear to consume fewer perquisites, implying lower agency cost with corporate donations.
（2）Internal pyramid structure, contract enforcement, minority investor protection, and firms' performance: Evidence from emerging economies
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2019.101170
Abstract:This study investigates the relationship between internal pyramid structure and performance of Chinese, Pakistani, Malaysian pyramidal firms, the effect of judicial efficiency and minority investor protection on this relationship. The results show that the pyramid structure of Pakistani firms is more complicated than Chinese and Malaysian firms, both vertically and horizontally. The study finds that the impact of control layers on performance is negative and stronger than control chains. Moreover, the results illustrate that the effect of control layers on performance at Chinese firms is negative but lower than at Pakistani and Malaysian firms. However, control chains have insignificant association with performance at Chinese pyramid firms. We find that efficient judiciary abates the negative impact of control layers and chains on performance. Our results reveal that in the absence of efficient courts the minority investors' protection have insignificant impact on the association between internal pyramid structure and firms' performance.
